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Perhaps no episode in medieval literature has proven as puzzling to modern 
readers as the pardon scene in the B text of Piers Plowman.* Critics continue 
to debate whether the document which Piers receives in Passus VII is a 
pardon. The document is, after all, sent by Truth, the divine authority 
whose tower overshadows the fair field. Its message - "Et qui bona egerunt 
ibunt in vitam eternam; / Qui vero mala in ignem eternum" - is an article of 
the Athanasian Creed and thus an orthodox tenet of the faith. Moreover, 
critics who argue that Truth's document is a pardon maintain that its text is 
consistent with the theme of the Visio. Frank, for example, contends that 
"the message of the pardon, do well, is a logical culmination of the doctrine 
of labor and good works preached throughout the Visio. If the pardon is no 
pardon, if do well is not the way to salvation, the reader has been led down 
the garden path by a most irresponsible poet."' Many readers of Piers 
Plowman remain uncomfortable with this interpretation, however, because, 
contrary to what we expect, Piers himself tears up the parchment from 
Truth and vows to change his life. Piers's response is hardly that of a man 
who accepts "do wel and haue wel" as a pardon, and his action forces us to 
examine what doing well meant to a medieval audience. If we place the 
poem in a historical context, we discover the importance of a crucial theolog- 
ical controversy of the fourteenth century to the understanding of the issues 
involved in the pardon scene. The relationship between the "doctrine of 
labor and good works" expressed in Truth's pardon and in the theological 
debate between the Augustinians and the Nominalists demonstrates conclu- 
sively that Langland does not intend Truth's pardon as a true pardon.2 
Let us begin by considering the circumstances in which Piers receives the 
* A research grant for the summer of 1978 from the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro enabled me to complete this essay. An earlier version of it was presented at the 
Fourth Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Medieval Association held at the University of 
Kentucky on March 3-4, 1978. 
1 Robert W. Frank, Jr., Piers Plowman and the Scheme of Salvation (New Haven, 1957), p. 25. 
2 Two other critics who consider the influence of fourteenth-century theology on the pardon 
scene of Piers Plowman are John Francis McNamara, "Responses to Ockhamist Theology in the 
Poetry of the Pearl-poet, Langland, and Chaucer" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1968), pp. 89-96, and Elizabeth Kirk, The Dream Thought of Piers Plowman (New Haven, 1972), 
pp. 97-99. Both McNamara and Kirk argue, however, that Truth's message to Piers is a pardon. 
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message from Truth in the B text. The plowman first appears on the fair 
field in Passus V, after the confession of the Seven Deadly Sins. He immedi- 
ately assumes the role of a guide in directing the penitents on a pilgrimage 
to Truth. According to Piers the repenting sinners can approach Truth's 
castle by obeying the Mosaic Law, but they can gain entrance only through 
penance and grace.3 Before the pilgrimage can proceed, however, Piers 
decides to plow his half acre and, at the beginning of Passus VI, he engages 
the penitents to assist him in this task. The day's work soon extends to a half 
year and the temporary postponement becomes permanent. Piers never 
embarks on the pilgrimage, but in Passus VII he nonetheless receives a 
pardon. 
An important consideration in evaluating the document which Piers re- 
ceives in Passus VII, then, is whether he attains the goal of the pilgrimage, 
that is, the pardon, without undertaking the actual journey. Since Piers's 
directions to Truth's castle are allegorical and the path he describes leads 
inward to Truth in man's heart, we might assume, as Burrow does, that 
Langland does not distinguish between pilgrimage and plowing and that the 
plowing of the half acre is, indeed, the pilgrimage.4 In the last of his four 
references to the pilgrimage in Passus VI, Piers himself equates the journey 
to Truth with plowing. 
"I wol worshipe perwip trupe by my lyue, 
And ben his pilgrym atte plow for pouere mennes sake." 
(6.101-2) 
Furthermore, in Passus VII Truth seems to affirm Piers's identification of 
plowing as pilgrimage by sending him the pardon. 
Treu]e herde telle herof, and to Piers sente 
To [t]aken his teme and tilien pe er]e, 
And purchaced hym a pardoun a pena & a culpa 
For hym and for hise heires eueremoore after. 
And bad hym holde hym at home and erien hise leyes, 
And alle pat holpen to erye or to sowe, 
Or any [maner] mestier pat my3te Piers [helpe], 
Pardon wip Piers Plowman trupe hap ygraunted. 
(7.1-8) 
From this evidence Burrow concludes that "Piers and his faithful followers 
. . .are on the highway to Truth, 'non pedibus, sed moribus,' when they stay at 
home labouring in their vocations and helping their neighbours, since this is 
3Piers Plowman: The B Version, ed. George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson (London, 1975), 
5.560-608. All subsequent quotations are from this edition. 
4John Burrow, "The Action of Langland's Second Vision," Essays in Criticism 15 (1965), 
247-68. Mary Carruthers agrees with Burrow's conflation of plowing and pilgrimage in The 
Searchfor St. Truth (Evanston, 1973), pp. 64-66. 
Piers Plowman and Fourteenth-Century Theology 717 
the way of truth which Truth himself taught. They are worshipping him not 
in Jerusalem but in spirit - 'by their lives' as Piers says (VI, 103)."5 
Although Burrow's explanation seems reasonable, it does not adequately 
explain Langland's rejection of plowing as pilgrimage in the pardon scene. 
After Piers tears up the document from Truth, he explicitly reverses the 
decision he made in Passus VI. 
.. ."Si ambulauero in medio vmbre mortis 
Non timebo mala quoniam tu mecum es. 
I shal cessen of my sowyng," quod Piers, "& swynke no3t so harde, 
Ne aboute my [bilyue] so bisy be na moore; 
Of preieres and of penaunce my plou3 shal ben herafter, 
And wepen whan I sholde [werche] Pou3 whete breed me faille." 
(7.120-25) 
Not only does Piers destroy the document, he also ignores Truth's command 
to cultivate his land. Instead of forsaking the pilgrimage to plow his half 
acre, Piers will, in the future, direct his energies toward acts of atonement. 
Piers's reaction thus refutes Burrow's claim that Langland equates plowing 
with pilgrimage; obviously, the poet distinguishes between these two ac- 
tivities and our understanding of the meaning of this distinction is crucial to 
our understanding of the pardon scene.6 How must the message from Truth 
be interpreted, then, to account for Piers's change from plowman to pilgrim? 
Although the message of Truth's pardon, which Frank paraphrases as "do 
good works and be saved," poses no difficulty for the modern reader, the 
issue was much more complex and controversial for Langland's original 
audience. Conflicting views about man's ability to do good works were at the 
heart of a theological dispute waged throughout the fourteenth century 
between the Augustinians and the Nominalists.7 The Augustinians regarded 
5 Burrow, "Action," p. 259. 
6 In Piers Plowman: An Interpretation of the A-Text (Dublin, 1937), T. P. Dunning also discusses 
this distinction between plowing and pilgrimage, but he argues that plowing exemplifies man's 
means of providing himself with the bona temporalia necessary to maintain life and that this issue 
is Langland's primary concern in the Visio (pp. 127-31 and 147-52). 
7 My discussion focuses on only one of the many issues addressed by fourteenth-century 
scholasticism. For an assessment of recent scholarship on the various schools of fourteenth- 
century thought and a survey of Ockhamist views on epistemology, ethics, and society, see 
William J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion," in The Pursuit of Holiness in 
Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles Trinkaus with Heiko Oberman (Leiden, 
1974), pp. 26-59. As Courtenay indicates, historians now recognize three movements of late 
scholasticism: a conservative Augustinian group (including Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory 
of Rimini); a moderate or Ockhamist group (including Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, and Gabriel 
Biel); and a radical group (including Robert Holcot, Adam Woodham, Nicholas of Autrecourt, 
and John of Mirecourt). Despite several differences between them, the moderate and radical 
groups share a semi-Pelagian concept of salvation and a contractual model of the relationship 
between God and man (pp. 47, 51). Following the suggestion of Courtenay, I will use Nominalist 
to refer to these similarities between the moderates and the radicals (p. 53). In my discussion of 
fourteenth-century theology, I am also indebted to the following scholars: Gordon Leff, Brad- 
wardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge, Eng., 1957); idem, Gregory of Rimini (Manchester, Eng., 
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the Nominalist position as Pelagian; in his De causa Dei Bradwardine attacked 
those of his contemporaries who "cum Pelagio pro libera arbitrio contra 
gratuitam tuam pugnant."8 While the two groups disagreed on several 
theological matters, including the causes of predestination and justification, 
the most important point of contention for our purposes involved the rela- 
tionship between grace and good works. 
The Augustinians, of course, claimed that man did not have the natural 
ability to perform good works and that his will had been further debilitated 
by original and personal sin. Therefore, grace was necessary to enable man 
to do good. By insisting on man's need for such prevenient grace, however, 
the traditional Augustinians did not deny free will. Rather, they argued that 
without grace man's will was not free but paralyzed by sin. Prevenient grace 
emancipated man's will from the shackles of sin and allowed him to choose 
between good and evil. If, as a result of this emancipation of the will, man 
chose to do good, grace also enabled him to accomplish the good work. 
Augustine distinguished these two effects of prevenient grace as operation 
and cooperation. 
Et quis istam etsi parvam dare coeperat charitatem, nisi ille qui praeparat volun- 
tatem, et cooperando perficit, quod operando incipit? Quoniam ipse ut velimus 
operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens ... Ut ergo velimus, sine 
nobis operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum 
cooperatur: tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante cum volumus, 
ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus.9 
Through this distinction between the two stages of prevenient grace, opera- 
tion and cooperation, the Augustinians simultaneously affirmed man's de- 
pendence on grace and the freedom of his will. In the first stage, the 
operation of grace instilled faith in man; if he then desired to do good, he 
1961), pp. 155-242; idem, William of Ockham (Manchester, Eng., 1975), pp. 470-525; Heiko 
Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism," Harvard Theological Review 53 (1960), 
47-76; idem, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); idem, ed., Forerunners of 
the Reformation, trans. Paul L. Nyhus (New York, 1966), pp. 123-64; David Knowles, The End of 
the Middle Ages, vol. 2 of The Religious Orders in England (Cambridge, Eng., 1955), pp. 74-89. 
8 Quoted from De causa Dei by James A. Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," 
Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968), 193. Although Bradwardine was an important critic of the 
Nominalists, his concept of divine participation in every human act was not in keeping with 
traditional Augustinianism. I do not contend that Langland was influenced by either Bradwar- 
dine or his disciple, Wyclif. Rather, Langland's view is similar to that of traditional Augustinians 
like Gregory of Rimini. For a discussion of the differences between Bradwardine and Gregory, 
see Leff, Gregory, pp. 239-42. Although Oberman identifies Gregory of Rimini as a "right wing 
nominalist," he uses this term to designate the conservative Augustinian group of fourteenth- 
century scholasticism and acknowledges that Gregory is "one of the most impressive representa- 
tives of late medieval Augustinianism" (Harvest, p. 204, and "Some Notes," pp. 51-56; Cour- 
tenay, "Nominalism," p. 34). 
9 
Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio 17.33, PL 44:901. I quote Augustine rather than one of 
his fourteenth-century disciples because their works are not available in modern editions, but 
see Leff, Gregory, pp. 180-81. 
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would pray for the cooperation of grace to accomplish the act. As Augustine 
wrote: 
Ergo spiritus gratiae facit ut habeamus fidem, ut per fidem impetremus orando, ut 
possimus facere quae jubemur. Ideo ipse Apostolus assidue legi praeponit fidem: 
quoniam quod lex jubet, facere non valemus, nisi per fidem rogando impetremus, 
ut facere valeamus.10 
Faith, then, was evidence that prevenient grace was operating in man and 
prayer, proof that man desired to cooperate with grace. And, according to 
the Augustinians, grace preceded both free will and good works. 
While the Augustinians emphasized the priority of grace, the Nominalists 
insisted that man was sufficiently free to dispose himself to receive God's 
grace."1 Thus the Nominalists contradicted the Augustinian teaching about 
man's debilitated nature. Despite original sin, they claimed man's will was 
free and it need not be emancipated by prevenient grace before he could do 
good. Ockham, for example, asserted that man, relying solely on his natural 
ability, can love God above all else.12 Furthermore, the Nominalists con- 
tended that through good works accomplished ex puris naturalibus man 
gained grace and merit de congruo.13 Although they acknowledged that this 
merit derived not from the intrinsic value of man's natural acts, but from 
God's decision under his potentia ordinata to accept these acts as meritorious, 
the Nominalists nevertheless argued that God must grant grace and merit de 
congruo to the man whofacit quod in se est. They fostered a contractual model 
of the relationship between man and God and "often interpreted the cove- 
nant of salvation in the sense that God was a debtor, committed to reward 
10 
Augustine, De gratia 14.28, PL 44:898. 
11 The Nominalists emphasized the distinction between God's potentia absoluta, the omnipo- 
tence which made all things possible to him except contradiction, and his potentia ordinata, the 
limitations which God placed on his omnipotence in establishing the present order. In their 
speculations about God's potentia absoluta, the Nominalists contended that the habit of grace was 
not necessary for salvation; Ockham, for example, argued, "Nihil est meritorium nisi quod est 
in nostra potestate, ergo actus non est meritorious principaliter propter illam gratiam, sed 
propter voluntatem libere causantem, ergo posset Deus talem actum elicitum a voluntate 
acceptare sine gratia" (Quodlibetum 6, q. 1, quoted by Knowles, End, p. 79). Ockham's view about 
the irrelevance of grace under the potentia absoluta was censured as Pelagian at Oxford and 
Avignon in the 1320s. Although the Nominalists conceded that grace was necessary for salvation 
under God's potentia ordinata or the established order, they continued to insist on the semi- 
Pelagian idea that free will and not grace was the primary cause of good acts. See Courtenay, 
"Nominalism," pp. 37-43 and 47; Oberman, Harvest, pp. 139-41, 176-77, 246, and 427. 
12 Leff, William, p. 493, and Oberman, Harvest, pp. 210-11. 
13 Medieval theologians distinguished between two kinds of merit, de condigno and de congruo. 
Man gained merit de condigno, or strict merit, only by performing good works in a state of 
habitual grace. According to the Nominalists, however, man could also acquire merit de congruo 
for good works performed without habitual grace. The Augustinians denounced this emphasis 
on merit de congruo as Pelagian. See Leff, Bradwardine, pp. 156-59 and 203-05, Gregory, pp. 177 
and 180, William, pp. 493-95; Oberman, Forerunners, pp. 129-33. 
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with grace and eventually with eternal life the man who did what was in 
him."14 
The Nominalists thus reversed the Augustinian teaching: grace was not 
the prerequisite but the consequence of good works. Their contractual 
attitude contrasted sharply with the Augustinian view that man received 
grace "not ex pacto but ex misericordia Dei," not as payment but as gift.15 
Moreover, the Augustinians rejected the notion of merit de congruo, insisting 
instead that only good works performed by a man in the state of habitual 
grace earned merit de condigno. In the fourteenth century, then, the 
Nominalist semi-Pelagian view that free will and not grace was the primary 
cause of good works contradicted the traditional Augustinian emphasis on 
man's dependence on God's mercy and grace. 
If we consider Langland's Visio in the context of this important 
fourteenth-century debate, we recognize that plowing and pilgrimage indi- 
cate the contending opinions about good works and grace expressed by the 
Nominalists and the Augustinians. Plowing represents the Nominalist view 
that man can earn grace through good works; that he can, without any 
special help from God, "do wel and haue wel."'6 Pilgrimage, on the other 
hand, is a penitential act through which man acknowledges his need for 
grace in order to accomplish good works; it thus represents the Augustinian 
view.17 If we examine Piers's reaction to the document from Truth, we 
recognize the dominance of Augustinian theology in Langland's poem. At 
the moment of tearing the pardon, Piers is a man in whom God's grace is 
14 William J. Courtenay, "Covenant and Causality in Pierre D'Ailly," SPECULUM 46 (1971), 118, 
and "Nominalism," p. 51. 
15 Courtenay, "Covenant," p. 100; Augustine, De gratia 5.11, PL 44:888. 
16 In his discussion of Chaucer's Plowman, Donald Howard comments: "And plowing itself 
symbolized the good works a Christian might do; the frequent references in Scripture to 
plowing and sowing were so interpreted, as the references to reaping and harvesting were 
understood to signify judgment" (The Idea of The Canterbury Tales [Berkeley, 1976], p. 101). 
Piers's plowing becomes allegorical in Dobest, but Langland explains the allegory to us. In the 
Visio Langland uses literal plowing as an example of good works in general. See David Aers, 
Piers Plowman and Christian Allegory (New York, 1975), for a refutation of the allegorical 
interpretation of plowing in the Visio given by D. W. Robertson, Jr., and Bernard Huppe, Piers 
Plowman and Scriptural Tradition (Princeton, 1951). 
17 Critics of The Canterbury Tales have often discussed the penitential nature of pilgrimage. See 
Ralph Baldwin, The Unity of The Canterbury Tales, Anglistica 5 (Copenhagen, 1955), excerpts 
repr. in Chaucer Criticism: The Canterbury Tales, ed. Richard Schoeck and Jerome Taylor (Notre 
Dame, Indiana, 1960); and Charles P. R. Tisdale, "The Medieval Pilgrimage and Its Use in The 
Canterbury Tales" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1969). Frank, Scheme, pp. 30-33, argues that 
penance is the "do wel" referred to in Truth's document. However, this interpretation overlooks 
the fact that Truth's message also includes the command to continue plowing, a command 
which Piers explicitly violates in turning to the penitential life. In this context, then, "do wel" 
must refer to works such as plowing rather than to penance. Later in the poem Conscience and 
Patience redefine dowel as penance and faith (14.16-28, 14.82-97). Piers's conversion in Passus 
VII anticipates this penitential definition in Passus XIV, but we misinterpret the poem if we 
violate its sequence of ideas. 
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operating. His response begins with a declaration of faith: "'Si ambulauero 
in medio vmbre mortis / Non timebo mala quoniam tu mecum es'" (7.120- 
21). Then he realizes the foolishness and futility of trying to perform good 
works without God's help; the plowing which he believed was a good act he 
now sees was wrongly motivated. 
"I shal cessen of my sowyng," quod Piers, "& swynke no3t so harde, 
Ne aboute my [bilyue] so bisy be na moore" 
(7.122-23) 
Finally, Piers vows to seek the strength he requires to do good works from 
God. "'Of preieres and of penaunce my plou3 shal ben herafter'" (7.124). 
In turning from plowing to pilgrimage Piers is following an Augustinian 
injunction: "ut homo qui voluerit et non potuerit, nondum se plene velle 
cognoscat, et oret ut habeat tantam voluntatem, quanta sufficit ad implenda 
mandata. Sic quippe adjuvatur, ut faciat quod jubetur."'8 Piers's change 
from plowman to penitent is a repudiation of the Nominalist claim that man 
can do good without grace. His affirmation of faith indicates that grace is 
operating in him; his vow to pray and do acts of penance demonstrates that 
he is cooperating with grace. 
The pardon scene is thus the moment of Piers's conversion. Prior to this 
episode, Piers himself exhibits a confidence in his own ability to do good 
works and earn grace which reveals a Nominalist tendency. When he first 
appears in the poem, he describes his relationship with God as that of 
employee to employer. 
"I haue ben his folwere al pis [fourty] wynter, 
Bone ysowen his seed and suwed hise beestes, 
WipInne and wipouten waited his profit, 
Idyke[d] and Id[o]lue, Ido pat [he] hotep. 
Som tyme I sowe and som tyme I presshe, 
In taillours craft and tynkeris craft, what trupe kan deuyse, 
I weue and I wynde and do what trupe hotep. 
For pou3 I seye it myself I serue hym to paye; 
I haue myn hire [of hym] wel and ouperwhiles moore. 
He is pe presteste paiere pat pouere men knowep; 
He wiphalt noon hewe his hire pat he ne hap it at euen." 
(5.542-52) 
In this passage Piers boasts of his ability to do as Truth bids, to serve him 
satisfactorily; he makes no mention of man's need for prevenient grace. And 
in the directions to Truth's castle which Piers gives the penitents, he claims 
that grace follows rather than precedes good works (5.561-608). Further- 
more, the wage metaphor that Piers uses to describe his relationship with 
God indicates that he believes his good works deserve repayment according 
18 Augustine, De gratia 15.31, PL 44:900. 
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to the rule of measurable hire (3.255-258), that grace is a recompense for 
services rendered rather than a generous gift from God.19 
It is precisely this contractual attitude which informs the Nominalist dis- 
cussion of merit de congruo and Truth's pardon: 
". . . do wel and haue wel, and god shal haue pi soule, 
And do yuel and haue yuel, [and] hope Pow noon ooper 
[That] after pi deep day pe deuel shal haue pi soule." 
(7.116-18) 
In the pardon scene, however, Piers comes to realize his mistake.20 He has 
learned through his failure on the half acre that natural man is unable to do 
well; he even finds himself guilty of being too concerned about his bely ioye. 
Piers's "pure tene" is therefore directed against himself, for he recognizes 
that he has been a fool. In tearing up the document from Truth, he 
acknowledges that he cannot earn grace and salvation through his own 
works.21 Piers thus repudiates the semi-Pelagianism of Nominalism and 
assumes an Augustinian posture with his expression of faith and his vow of 
penance, hoping that a merciful God will give him the grace to accomplish 
the good works he cannot perform naturally. 
One major objection to this interpretation of Piers's response is that the 
19 Piers's view resembles the Pearl Dreamer's interpretation of the parable of the laborers in 
the vineyard. The Pearl maiden corrects this attitude, explaining that even the best of men sin 
and must be saved by God's mercy and grace, not their own works. See Pearl, ed. E. V. Gordon 
(Oxford, 1953), §§ 9-12, pp. 18-26; Kirk, Dream Thought, p. 77. 
20 Kirk, Dream Thought, pp. 77, 88-93, and Carruthers, Search, pp. 72-75, discuss Piers's 
conversion in Passus VII as a change from an Old to a New Law psychology. However, as 
Courtenay observes, there is a striking similarity between the Hebrews' attitude toward their 
covenant with Yahweh and the Nominalists' interpretation of their relationship with God under 
his potentia ordinata ("Covenant," p. 118). Since Piers's allegorical map to Truth in Passus V 
includes not only the Ten Commandments but also grace and the sacrament of penance, it is 
more appropriate to identify it with the semi-Pelagian Nominalist concept of merit de congruo 
than with the Old Law alone. 
21 Most critics believe that Piers is angry with the priest for denying that Truth's message is a 
pardon. Robertson and Huppe, Scriptural Tradition, pp. 93-94, Frank, Scheme, pp. 28-29, and 
Carruthers, Search, p. 77, all argue that Piers tears up the document in order to contrast his true 
understanding of its meaning with the literal-minded misinterpretation of the priest. However, 
this reading does not adequately account for Piers's failure to obey Truth's command to 
continue plowing. While Piers does argue with the priest for deriding his allusions to Scripture 
later in the scene, his conversion from plowing to penance indicates that he agrees with the 
priest, although perhaps for different reasons, that Truth's message is not a pardon. Kirk, 
Dream Thought, contends that Piers is outraged at Truth and that the plowman "vents his 
resentment at God's transcendent superiority on God's immanent manifestation of himself (the 
pardon) by destroying the manifestation, thereby releasing its energies" (p. 94). But Kirk's 
discussion of the pardon scene as an "explosive confrontation" (p. 95) between God's will and 
man's imposes a modern psychology on the poem. In Augustinian thought it is precisely an 
intervention by God, the infusion of grace, which frees man's will from the bondage of original 
sin. I cannot agree with Kirk's view that the pardon scene expresses "the ambivalence in man's 
attitude to salvation, which he resists as much as he desires it" (p. 96). 
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document he tears up comes from Truth. It is obvious that Langland 
associates Truth with good works, for he sends Piers the pardon with the 
command to continue plowing. Why would Langland ascribe such a position 
to Truth? To answer this question we need only recognize that Truth is God 
the Father, the lawgiver and judge; his message to Piers is an injunction to 
obey the Law. The criterion for salvation established by Truth's document is 
valid, but it is impossible to fulfill without grace. Augustine, quoting Paul, 
emphasized man's inadequacy before the Law: 
"Quia non justificabitur ex lege omnis caro coram illo: per legem enim cognitio 
peccati" [Rom. 3.20]. "Cognitio" dixit; non, Consurnptio. Quando autem cognoscit 
homo peccatum, si non adjuvat gratia ut cognitum caveatur, sine dubio lex iram 
operatur.... non quia lex mala est; sed quia sub illa sunt quos reos facitjubendo, 
non adjuvando. Gratia quippe adjuvat ut legis quisque sit factor, sine qua gratia 
sub lege positus tantummodo erit legis auditor.22 
Without grace, man stands condemned under the Law. By destroying the 
document from Truth, Piers admits his own inability to satisfy the demands 
of the Law and to accept such an injunction as a pardon.23 In rejecting 
Truth's message as a pardon, however, Piers does not repudiate the Law nor 
deny man's need to do well; rather he refutes the mistaken view that man 
can meet the conditions set by Truth through his own efforts. The 
Dreamer's conclusions about the superiority of dowel over purchased par- 
dons at the end of the Visio are thus off the mark, for the real issue in the 
pardon scene is not whether man should do good works but how he can 
accomplish them. 
Since Truth's "pardon" is an affirmation of Law and justice, it is not a true 
pardon. However, Piers's reading of it coincides with the infusion of preve- 
22 Augustine, De gratia 10.22, PL 44:894, and 12.24, PL 44:896. Kirk, Dream Thought, pp. 
88-100, discusses Paul's Epistle to the Romans, from which Augustine quotes, as a commentary 
on the pardon scene. Although she presents a fine summary of Paul's concept of justification by 
faith rather than Law, she considers Truth's message as, paradoxically, a "pardon [couched] in 
words which are a formulation of the law" (p. 93). Kirk concludes that Truth's injunction to "do 
wel" is a pardon because she believes that Langland regards grace and salvation as the reward 
(meed) rather than the wages (measurable hire) for good works (p. 84, 93). Therefore, she 
argues that the pardon scene resolves the conflict between Nominalist and Augustinian theology 
because it asserts "that ethics both do and do not play a role in salvation" (p. 98). Despite her 
references to Paul and the fourteenth-century Augustinians, however, Kirk does not question 
man's ability to do well nor does she discuss grace as a prerequisite for good works. Thus she 
actually interprets Langland's pardon scene as an endorsement of the semi-Pelagian theology of 
Nominalism. 
23 Several critics associate Piers's tearing of the pardon with biblical and iconographic acts of 
destruction which mark the change from the Old to the New Law; see John Lawlor, "Piers 
Plowman: The Pardon Reconsidered," Modern Language Review 45 (1950), 456; Rosemary Woolf, 
"The Tearing of the Pardon," in Piers Plowman: Critical Approaches, ed. S. S. Hussey (London, 
1969), pp. 70-75; and Carruthers, Search, p. 71. Although Lawlor and Woolf agree that Truth's 
message is a statement of Law and thus not a pardon, Carruthers contends that it is "a pardon 
. .. based on the Law" (p. 69). 
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nient grace into his soul and, insofar as this confrontation with the Law 
incites Piers's awareness of his own inadequacy, it precipitates his coopera- 
tion with grace. Thus, while the Law itself is not grace, it often acts as a call 
to grace. As Augustine observed: 
. . . verum etiam quod visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus, et ut credamus, 
sive extrinsecus per evangelicas exhortationes, ubi et mandata legis aliquid agunt, si 
ad hoc admonent hominem infirmitatis suae, ut ad gratiam justificantem credendo 
confugiat; sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate quid ei veniat in mentem, 
sed consentire vel dissentire propriae voluntatis est.24 
Although the words of Truth's document are not words of pardon, they are 
the occasion of Piers's conversion from a Nominalist theology of works to an 
Augustinian theology of grace. 
But if Truth's document is not a pardon, why is it so identified in the 
poem? Is Truth guilty of untruth? Not at all. As Rosemary Woolf observes, 
"the true conclusion is not that Truth has lied, but that the poet for his own 
purposes has misled us; [for] it is the poet in his own voice, not God as a 
character in the poem who describes the document as a pardon."25 Lang- 
land's deliberate deception of his audience in Passus VII is the culmination 
of the strategy he uses in the Visio to bring his readers to an Augustinian 
awareness of their own inadequacy. Through the discrepancy between what 
they expect from a pardon and what Piers receives from Truth, the poet 
hopes to shock his audience into a recognition of the Nominalist sophistry 
and thus demonstrate to them their own fallibility.26 Langland begins mis- 
leading his readers in Passus V when he encourages them to see Piers as the 
one exemplary man on the fair field. Although Piers's attempt to fulfill 
Truth's commands is more admirable than the palmer's ignorance of them, 
he, too, is in error because he does not acknowledge his need for prevenient 
grace. However, Langland does not immediately reveal the deficiency of 
Piers's attitude but rather allows his readers to believe that Piers's choice of 
plowing over pilgrimage is one which the poet endorses. Langland's silence 
24 
Augustine, De spiritu et littera 34.60, PL 44:240. While Robertson and Huppe, Scriptural 
Tradition, pp. 91-94, and Carruthers, Search, pp. 69-70, recognize that man needs grace to 
perform good works, they contend that in giving Piers a command to obey the Law, Truth also 
gives him the grace to fulfill it. They conclude, therefore, that although Truth's message is 
literally an injunction to do good works, it is allegorically a pardon. But this interpretation 
violates Augustine's distinction between Law and grace and fails to explain Piers's conversion to 
the penitential life. Although Piers receives Truth's message at the same time he receives 
prevenient grace, the Law is not thus transformed into a pardon. 
25 Woolf, "Tearing," p. 53; but she explains the purpose of the deception as "poetic anticipa- 
tion and illuminating paradox," arguing that although Truth's document is not a pardon when 
Piers receives it, it becomes one after he tears it up (p. 70). 
26 Woolf, "Tearing," pp. 53-54, and Kirk, Dream Thought, pp. 83-85, 98, also describe the 
reader's shock and bewilderment at Truth's message, but they attribute this effect to paradox 
rather than to Langland's strategy for converting his reader. 
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thus induces his audience to share the plowman's confidence that man can 
do well ex puris naturalibus. Although the failure of Piers's efforts to reform 
the half acre calls into question such an optimism, the readers nonetheless 
believe that Piers deserves a reward because he facit quod in se est. The 
audience finds nothing amiss, then, when the narrator announces at the 
beginning of Passus VII that Truth has sent Piers a pardon even though he 
has not embarked on the pilgrimage. But Langland dramatically shatters his 
audience's expectations by making Truth's pardon a statement of Law and 
thus a startling indictment of the Nominalist view which Piers expresses. By 
asserting that natural man can obey the Law, the Nominalists were denying 
the effects-of original sin, contending that Law itself was a "pardon" a pena et 
a culpa. But ironically if man could fulfill the conditions of such a "pardon," 
he would need no pardon at all. Confronted with the obvious discrepancy 
between the words of Truth's document and the claim that it is a pardon, 
Piers is forced to repudiate his previous Nominalist position. The reader, 
shocked and bewildered by Piers's response, also comes to a realization of his 
own fallibility. 
Although Truth's pardon is not a true pardon, Langland is not, as Frank 
suggests, an irresponsible poet.27 He leads his readers "down the garden 
path," encouraging them to make Nominalist assumptions about the rela- 
tionship between good works and grace, as part of a sophisticated strategy 
designed to convert his audience to an Augustinian consciousness of man's 
dependence on God's gift of grace. At the end of the Visio, Langland exhorts 
his reader: 
Forpi I counseille alle cristene to crie god mercy, 
And Marie his moder be meene bitwene, 
That god gyue vs grace er we go hennes 
Swiche werkes to werche, while we ben here, 
That, after oure deep day, dowel reherce 
A jPe day of dome we dide as he hi3te. 
(7.201-6) 
Langland thus paradoxically misleads his readers in order to lead them to 
the truth. 
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27 Lest any readers fail to perceive the inappropriateness of regarding Truth's message as a 
pardon, Langland presents three other documents later in Piers Plowman which correct the 
Visio's "pardon": the acquittance which Patience gives Haukyn in Dowel (14.180-95), the patent 
which Love sends to Peace in Dobet (18.182-87), and the pardon which Christ grants to Piers in 
Dobest (19.183-90). Thus in the Vita Langland explains discursively the ideas presented dramat- 
ically in the pardon scene and his temporary deception of his audience is not merely an 
irresponsible trick, but a strategy which provides the impetus for the rest of the poem. 
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